Surprisingly, the 1977 "Russian flu" H1N1 pandemic influenza virus was genetically indistinguishable from strains that had circulated decades earlier but had gone extinct in 1957. This essay puts forward the most plausible chronology to explain the reemergence of the 1977 H1N1 pandemic virus: (1) in January–February 1976, a self-limited small outbreak of a swine H1N1 influenza virus occurred among Army personnel at Fort Dix, New Jersey; (2) in March 1976, the US launched a nationwide H1N1 swine influenza vaccine program; (3) (...) other countries then also launched their own H1N1 R&D efforts; (4) a new H1N1 outbreak, genetically unrelated to the Fort Dix swine virus but indistinguishable from previously extinct H1N1 viruses, was detected early in 1977 in China; (5) the leading Chinese influenza virologist later disclosed that the Chinese military had conducted large H1N1 vaccine R&D studies in 1976. It is likely that the resurrected H1N1 influenza viruses were laboratory-stored strains that were unfrozen and studied as part of the emergency response to a perceived epidemic threat, and that accidentally escaped. The fear of a _possible_ H1N1 pandemic was the critical factor that gave rise to the _actual_ H1N1 pandemic, resulting in an avoidable "self-fulfilling prophecy pandemic.". (shrink)

Health research increasingly relies on organized collections of health data and biological samples. There are many types of sample and data collections that are used for health research, though these are collected for many purposes, not all of which are health-related. These collections exist under different jurisdictional and regulatory arrangements and include: 1) Population biobanks, cohort studies, and genome databases 2) Clinical and public health data 3) Direct-to-consumer genetic testing 4) Social media 5) Fitness trackers, health apps, and biometric data (...) sensors Population biobanks, cohort studies, and genome databases Clinical and public health data Direct-to-consumer genetic testing Social media Fitness trackers, health apps, and biometric data sensors Ethical, legal, and social challenges of such collections are well recognized, but there has been limited attention to the broader societal implications of the existence of these collections. Although health research conducted using these collections is broadly recognized as beneficent, secondary uses of these data and samples may be controversial. We examine both documented and hypothetical scenarios of secondary uses of health data and samples. In particular, we focus on the use of health data for purposes of: Forensic investigations Civil lawsuits Identification of victims of mass casualty events Denial of entry for border security and immigration Making health resource rationing decisions Facilitating human rights abuses in autocratic regimes Forensic investigations Civil lawsuits Identification of victims of mass casualty events Denial of entry for border security and immigration Making health resource rationing decisions Facilitating human rights abuses in autocratic regimes Current safeguards relating to the use of health data and samples include research ethics oversight and privacy laws. These safeguards have a strong focus on informed consent and anonymization, which are aimed at the protection of the individual research subject. They are not intended to address broader societal implications of health data and sample collections. As such, existing arrangements are insufficient to protect against subversion of health databases for non-sanctioned secondary uses, or to provide guidance for reasonable but controversial secondary uses. We are concerned that existing debate in the scholarly literature and beyond has not sufficiently recognized the secondary data uses we outline in this paper. Our main purpose, therefore, is to raise awareness of the potential for unforeseen and unintended consequences, in particular negative consequences, of the increased availability and development of health data collections for research, by providing a comprehensive review of documented and hypothetical non-health research uses of such data. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum and Seyla Benhabib have raised the question of how the Western subject might engage with the non-Western other in a non-imperialistic fashion. However, both of these feminist thinkers propose a universalist framework, consistent with Donald Davidson’s conclusions regarding the translatability of ”conceptual schemes”. Drawing upon the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and Walter Benjamin, I argue that the historically constituted subject that emerges in the wake of the Enlightenment affords an account of subjectivity that recasts the meaning of (...) rationality and thus the way in which translation should be understood. I shall argue, with Benjamin, that a linguistic conceptual scheme--in short, a world—needs translation in order to remain vital, and that genuine translation not only translates the other but transforms the self who seeks to translate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Romanian Cultural and Political IdentityDonald R. KelleyThe Journal of the History of Ideas, in collaboration with other institutions, including the Universities of Bucharest and Budapest and the Soros Foundation, recently sponsored the second in a series of international conferences being planned on topics in current intellectual history. (The first, “Interrogating Tradition,” was held at Rutgers University, 13–16 November 1997.) The Romanian conference, which was held in the Elisabeta Palace (...) in Bucharest (27–31 May 1998), was devoted to “Culture and the Politics of National Identity in Modern Romania.” Over forty scholars, mainly from Romania but some also from the U.S., France, Germany, and Hungary, gathered to discuss a variety of questions about Romanian society, past, present, and speculative future; and they were joined by at least as many visitors, especially students, from the local area and beyond.Topics discussed included politics, language, economics, historiography, religion, education, philosophy, ideologies, intelligentsia, particular intellectuals, minorities, and women (though not Gypsies or gays). Under this riot of rubrics a wide range of questions were posed in interdisciplinary fashion, with frequent, sometimes impassioned interventions. What is—was, might have been, can be—Romania? Who is a Romanian (and who not)? What is Romania’s relation to the West and the East? (And what are the “West” and the “East”?) To modernity, to modernism, to modernization? What is—has been, should be—the function of intellectuals, of political and cultural elites, in understanding the Romanian past and in setting a course for the future? What, more generally, is the role of history in answering such questions? Or is history perhaps (as Karl Krause remarked of psychoanalysis) the disease for which it claims to be the cure?Keith Hitchens’s keynote address suggested that rehashing old essentialist debates might not be productive at millennium’s end, but the conference itself could not avoid some excursions down the paths of memory and myth. For historians, Western historians anyway, Romania seems to have too many pasts. Located at the juncture of four previous empires, Romania is a mosaic, or perhaps a pandemonium, of ethnic, religious, economic, and ideological groups that can only imagine, or invent, a nationality. Geographically (and in many ways culturally) remote from the West, Romania for a long time (as Sorin Antohi remarked) lacked both a public sphere and a civil society; and suffering “a Counter-Reformation without a Reformation” (Alexandru Dutu’s phrase), it has not enjoyed a tradition of religious or ethnic toleration. Nor have either the Germans or the Jews (as Glass said) found their own unity within the changing borders of the modern Romanian state. Not until the nineteenth century did Romania develop, out of its Boyar background (as Siupiur argued), an intellectual elite that could create a modern national history and help turn “peasants into Romanians” (Antohi’s phrase); and even then this elite seemed more attracted to conservative [End Page 735] (Herder, Savigny, Burke) than to liberal views of autochthonism. Many features of Western modernity, such as Newtonian science, reached Romania late, and indeed there was a retrograde movement against liberalism under the aegis by orthodox religion. In any case this intelligentsia has been as fragmented and multiform as the Romanian past itself. True, some Romanian scholars like to posit a mainstream tradition, “excesses aside,” as one speaker put it—but how, asked another, can historians put “excesses” aside from the devastating perspective of this century?Political and cultural self-examination was the dominant theme of this conference. Nationality, said Pippidi, depends on three factors, viz., name, language, religion, and territory. The Romanian name dates from the tenth century, indicating a separation of the Roman from the Greek tradition in Wallachia; and from the seventeenth century the idea of a mainly Roman provenance was given privilege. As a language, “Romanian” was spoken in the late Middle Ages, but the first written document is dated 1521. The principal religion in Romania was and is Greek orthodox, although there are also Roman Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, and German Protestant communities, as well as the Uniate church created in the eighteenth century. As for the territory, this has been a matter of change, conflict, and confusion throughout the tragic course... (shrink)

Johnstone, H. W., Jr. Rhetoric and communication in philosophy.--Smith, C. R. and Douglas, D. G. Philosophical principles in the traditional and emerging views of rhetoric.--Wallace, K. R. Bacon's conception of rhetoric.--Thonssen, L. W. Thomas Hobbes's philosophy of speech.--Walter, O. M., Jr. Descartes on reasoning.--Douglas, D. G. Spinoza and the methodology of reflective knowledge in persuasion.--Howell, W. S. John Locke and the new rhetoric.--Doering, J. F. David Hume on oratory.--Douglas, D. G. A neo-Kantian approach to the epistomology of judgment in criticism.--Bevilacqua, (...) V. M. Lord Kames's theory of rhetoric.--Brockriede, W. E. Bentham's philosophy of rhetoric.--Anderson, R. E. Kierkegaard's theory of communication.--Macksoud, S. J. Ludwig Wittgenstein, radical operationism and rhetorical stance.--Stewart, J. J. L. Austin's speech act analysis.--Torrence, D. L. A philosophy of rhetoric from Bertrand Russell.--Clark, A. Martin Buber, dialogue, and the philosophy of rhetoric.--Bennett, W. Kenneth Burke--a philosophy in defense of un-reason.--Dearin, R. D. The philosophical basis of Chaim Perelman's theory of rhetoric. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From the Executive EditorDonald R. KelleyTwenty years ago the Journal of the History of Ideas moved from Temple University to the University of Rochester (through the efforts especially of J. Paul Hunter, then dean of the college of arts and sciences, and Lewis White Beck, professor of philosophy), and I replaced Philip Wiener, who had been editor for forty-five years, the first issue under my supervision being that of (...) July 1985. A year later Robin Ladrach joined me as assistant and then as associate editor, and in 1991 we both moved along with the JHI to Rutgers University (through the efforts especially of Richard McCormick, then dean of the faculty of arts and sciences and now president of the university). Now the Journal has moved to the University of Pennsylvania, and I pass on the editorship to a committee composed of Warren Breckman, Martin J. Burke, Anthony Grafton, and Ann E. Moyer, with Robin Ladrach continuing as managing editor.We changed our face in 1990, but otherwise we have maintained a remarkably steady course since the days of Arthur O. Lovejoy, original founder of the JHI in 1940, with articles submitted and articles published continuing in mostly the same quantity and intellectual range and following the interdisciplinary and cross-cultural vision established by Lovejoy in the 1930s (history of philosophy, science, political thought, historiography, religion, literature, art, and music) but also modified by intervening intellectual and cultural changes (and so enhanced by studies in the human sciences, gender, women's history, globalism, animals, etc.). Such change has for the most part not been from conscious editorial policy, except indirectly, but rather "from below," and the role of the editor has been that not of cultural critic but of observer, whose reflections have appeared in "Horizons of Intellectual History," JHI, 48 (1987), 143–69; "What is Happening to the History of Ideas?" JHI, 51 (1990), 3–25; "JHI 2000," JHI, 61 (2000), 153–56; and The History of Ideas: Canon and Variations (Rochester, N.Y., 1990), which contains also the reflections of Lovejoy and other earlier authors. The new regime may well introduce new departures, but I [End Page 475] believe that it will continue to rely and perhaps draw on the old Lovejovian tradition which has made this journal a successful and enduring international enterprise.Donald R. KelleyExecutive Editor Emeritus Rutgers UniversityCopyright © 2005 The Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.... (shrink)

Kurt Gödel is almost as famous—one might say “notorious”—for his extreme platonist views as he is famous for his mathematical theorems. Moreover his platonism is not a myth; it is well-documented in his writings. Here are two platonist declarations about set theory, the first from his paper about Bertrand Russell and the second from the revised version of his paper on the Continuum Hypotheses.Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived as real objects, namely classes as “pluralities of things” or (...) as structures consisting of a plurality of things and concepts as the properties and relations of things existing independently of our definitions and constructions.It seems to me that the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence.But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.The first statement is a platonist declaration of a fairly standard sort concerning set theory. What is unusual in it is the inclusion of concepts among the objects of mathematics. This I will explain below. The second statement expresses what looks like a rather wild thesis. (shrink)

I am struck by how little is known about so much of cognition. One goal of this paper is to argue for the need to consider a rich set of interlocking issues in the study of cognition. Mainstream work in cognition—including my own—ignores many critical aspects of animate cognitive systems. Perhaps one reason that existing theories say so little relevant to real world activities is the neglect of social and cultural factors, of emotion, and of the major points that distinguish (...) an animate cognitive system from an artificial one: the need to survive, to regulate its own operation, to maintain itself, to exist in the environment, to change from a small, uneducated, immature system to an adult, developed, knowledgeable one.Human cognition is not the same as artificial cognition, if only because the human organism must also be concerned with the problems of life, of development, of survival. There must be a regulatory system that interacts with the cognitive component. And it may well be that it is the cognitive component that is subservient, evolved primarily for the benefit of the regulatory system, working through the emotions, through affect.I argue that several concepts must become fundamental parts of the study of cognition, including the roles of culture, of social interaction, of emotions, and of motivation. I argue that there are at least 12 issues that should comprise the study of cognition, and thereby, the field of Cognitive Science. We need to study a wide variety of behavior before we can hope to understand a single class. Cognitive scientists as a whole ought to make more use of evidence from the neurosciences, from brain damage and mental illness, from cognitive sociology and anthropology, and from clinical studies of the human. These must be accompanied, of course, with the study of language, of the psychological aspects of human processing structures, and of artificially intelligent mechanisms. The study of Cognitive Science requires a complex interaction among different issues of concern, an interaction that will not be properly understood until all parts are understood, with no part independent of the others, the whole requiring the parts, and the parts the whole. (shrink)

William James and Alfred North Whitehead strongly rejected materialism as a metaphysical option. While James lived and wrote only up to the beginning of the revolution in physics that brought to the fore fundamentally different theories such as quantum theory and the special and general theories of relativity, Whitehead, as an accomplished mathematician, was readily conversant with these new developments. Since their respective times, however, much innovation and refinement of theories in physics and other natural sciences has taken place. With (...) these later developments, conceptions of matter and its capabilities have undergone far-reaching explicit and implicit changes. A consequence of these... (shrink)

Part 1. Introduction -- Introduction: Navigating the Perfect Moral Storm in Light of a Thirty-Five Year Debate -- Thirty-Five Year Climate Change Policy Debate -- Part 2. Priority Ethical Issues -- Ethical Problems with Cost Arguments -- Ethics and Scientific Uncertainty Arguments -- Atmospheric Targets -- Allocating National Emissions Targets -- Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs -- Obligations of Sub-national Governments, Organizations, Businesses, and Individuals -- Independent Responsibility to Act -- Part 3. The Crucial Role of Ethics in Climate (...) Change Policy Making -- Why Has Ethics Failed to Achieve Traction? -- Conclusion: Navigating the Perfect Moral Storm. (shrink)

Around the globe, economists affect markets by saying what markets are doing, what they should do, and what they will do. Increasingly, experimental economists are even designing real-world markets. But, despite these facts, economists are still largely thought of as scientists who merely observe markets from the outside, like astronomers look at the stars. Do Economists Make Markets? boldly challenges this view. It is the first book dedicated to the controversial question of whether economics is performative--of whether, in some cases, (...) economics actually produces the phenomena it analyzes.The book's case studies--including financial derivatives markets, telecommunications-frequency auctions, and individual transferable quotas in fisheries--give substance to the notion of the performativity of economics in an accessible, nontechnical way. Some chapters defend the notion; others attack it vigorously. The book ends with an extended chapter in which Michel Callon, the idea's main formulator, reflects upon the debate and asks what it means to say economics is performative.The book's insights and strong claims about the ways economics is entangled with the markets it studies should interest--and provoke--economic sociologists, economists, and other social scientists.In addition to the editors and Callon, the contributors include Marie-France Garcia-Parpet, Francesco Guala, Emmanuel Didier, Philip Mirowski, Edward Nik-Khah, Petter Holm, Vincent-Antonin Lépinay, and Timothy Mitchell. (shrink)

This book argues that the subjective and the objective are crucially dependent on one another and neither is intelligible apart from the other. There is no such thing as a purely external, in-itself world. This book is not intended as a defense of epistemological relativism but as a strong recommendation for modest fallibilism and pluralism.

Argues that a pluralistic understanding of truth can foster productive conversations about common concerns involving religion, science, ethics, politics, economics, and ecology without falling into relativism. In this book, Donald A. Crosby defends the idea that all claims to truth are at best partial. Recognizing this, he argues, is a necessary safeguard against arrogance, close-mindedness, and potentially violent reactions to differences of outlook and practice. Crosby demonstrates how “partial truths” are inevitably at work in conversations and debates about religion, (...) science, morality, economics, ecology, and social and political progress. He then focuses on the concept in the discipline of philosophy, looking at a number of distinctions that are taken to be strictly binary—those between fact and value, continuity and novelty, rationalism and empiricism, mind and body, and good and evil—and demonstrates how in all of these cases, each on its own can offer only an incomplete picture. Partial Truths and Our Common Future invites ongoing dialogue with others for the sake of mutual enlargements of understanding rather than mere civility, and provides incentive for continuing open-minded and shared inquiries into the important issues of life. “This is a transdisciplinary philosophical work that moves with grace across traditions, time periods, and thinkers. It is a master class in the existential and public relevance of philosophy and a rare example of a book that is both timely and timeless.” — Michael S. Hogue, author of The Promise of Religious Naturalism. (shrink)

A theoretical framework Is presented that distinguishes among three knowledge sources that form the basis for generative performance. The three knowledge sources, termed conceptual, procedural, and utilizational competence, were implemented as a computational model that derives plans for counting procedures. In a previous analysis, Greeno, Riley, and Gelman (1984) developed a characterization of the conceptual competence (implicit understanding of general concepts and principles) associated with the skill of counting and related conceptual competence to various models of performance. In the current (...) work all three knowledge sources are formalized in a computer program (COUNTPLAN) that generates planning nets of counting procedures. The sufficiency of COUNTPLAN's knowledge components is demonstrated through its capacity to generate new plans for counting in novel settings from a core of conceptual competence. The utility of COUNTPLAN to facilitate the distinction between hypotheses of competence and hypotheses of performance is discussed. (shrink)

Two key themes structure the work of French philosopher of science Gilbert Simondon: the processes of individuation and the nature of technical objects. Moreover, these two themes are also at the heart of contemporary debates within Ethics and Bioethics. Indeed, the question of the individual is a key concern in both Virtue Ethics and Feminist Ethics of Care, while the hyper-technical reality of the present stage of medical technology is a key reason for both the urgency for and the success (...) of the field of Bioethics. And yet, despite its potential for thinking about these issues, Simondon’s philosophy remains largely unknown. Rather than exploring Simondon’s complex ontology for itself, the aim of this paper is to establish what contribution his work can make in Ethics and Bioethics on two essential questions: the relational structure of the self and the nature of the human-technology relation. I argue that Simondon’s re-conceptualization of the individual harmonizes with perspectives in Feminist Bioethics (particularly the Ethics of Care) and points toward what I call an “open” Virtue Ethics that takes relations to be essential. In order to establish this connection, I explore at length the relational approach to Feminist Bioethics offered by Susan Sherwin’s work. I argue that a Simondonian account of technology and of the individual furthers the relational understanding of the self, offers a characterization of Virtue Ethics that is in harmony with the Ethics of Care, and clarifies a notion of responsibility that is implicated in the complex reality of the modern technological milieu. (shrink)

An eloquent case for regarding nature itself as the focus of religion—as the metaphysical ultimate deserving religious commitment.

The problem of evil is not an accidental difficulty for religion; it is the starting-point from which the search that sometimes leads to religion begins.The problem of evil of which Mary Midgley speaks is not just the relatively narrow theoretical one familiar to us in the West of how conceptually to reconcile an alleged absolute goodness and power of God with the rampant evil in the world, but the much broader existential one, applicable everywhere, of how to interpret, respond to, (...) and cope with the presence and power of evil in daily life. It is the problem of how to find courage and strength in the face of the relentless perils, sufferings, and losses experienced on an everyday basis by the world's creatures .. (shrink)

It is sometimes thought that individual religious faith should be firmly fixed in the traditions of the past. That once it is established in someone's life, it should remain steadfast and unchanging throughout personal, cultural, or any other changes. This book subverts that idea by showing how it is actually ongoing inquiry, examination, and indeed change, requiring similarly ongoing acts of informed and responsible freedom, that will produce a dynamic and meaningful faith. Contending that religious faith should readily encompass deliberate (...) and ongoing acts of personal freedom, the text outlines various ways in which these dual aspects are more ally than enemy. It also demonstrates how the ongoing free choices that are required for genuine faith are not absolute, but are in fact contextualized and conditioned by genetic makeup, environmental conditioning, and present character traits produced in part by a person's past choices. Despite this caveat, personal freedom is presented as genuine and real, with a vitally important role to play in a person's religiosity. The book concludes with some observations of this process in practice in the author's own journey from a Christian theist worldview to that of a religious naturalist. This is a fascinating treatise on the role of personal freedom in religious faith. It will, therefore, be of significant interest to scholars of religion, theology, philosophy of religion and religious naturalism. (shrink)

Pour Merleau-Ponty et Nancy, le sujet et son monde co-naissent ensemble dans le mouvement paradoxal du sentir. Dans cette perspective, le sentir serait alors un point de départ privilégié afin de déconstruire les théories classiques de la subjectivité et pour construire une nouvelle compréhension décentrée du sujet. Même si ces deux philosophes divergent sur la question du sujet, il est possible de les rapprocher sur la question du sentir et en particulier à propos de l’expérience de l’écoute. De cette façon, (...) nous ferons ressortir un ton radical chez le premier Merleau-Ponty et un timbre (ou une tonalité) phénoménologique chez Nancy. Pour ce faire, nous démontrons que l’écoute révèle la subjectivité comme activité de « coexistence » (et non pas de « coïncidence »), comme « co-naissance » (et non pas connaissance), et comme « trajectoire » (et non pas présence statique). En d’autres termes, c’est par la voie de l’écoute qu’on retrouve une théorie radicale de la subjectivité déjà présente dans la Phénoménologie de la perception, ainsi qu’une tonalité phénoménologique chez Nancy. For Merleau-Ponty and for Nancy, the subject and his or her world are born together (co-naissent) in the paradoxical movement of sensing. From this perspective, sensing is thus a privileged point of departure for the deconstruction of classical theories of subjectivity and for the construction of a new notion of a decentered subjectivity. Even though it may appear that these two thinkers diverge precisely with regard to the definition of the subject to be theorized, by bringing them together on the topic of sensing (and “listening” in particular), we are able to bring out a radical tone in Merleau-Ponty’s early work as well as a phenomenological timbre in Nancy’s thought. In this paper I demonstrate that listening reveals how subjectivity is an activity of “co-existence” rather than “co-incidence,” of “co-birth” (co-naissance) rather than “knowledge” (connaissance), and is a trajectory rather than a static presence. In other words, by listening to listening we rediscover a radical theory of subjectivity already at work in Phenomenology of Perception and a phenomenological tonality in the work of Nancy. Per Merleau-Ponty e Nancy, il soggetto e il suo mondo co-nascono nel movimento paradossale del sentire. In questa prospettiva, il sentire sarebbe allora un punto di partenza privilegiato per decostruire le teorie classiche della soggettività e costruire una nuova comprensione decentrata del soggetto. Anche se i due filosofi divergono sulla questione del soggetto, è possibile avvicinarli circa la questione del sentire e in particolare a proposito dell’esperienza dell’ascolto. In questo modo, cercheremo di far emergere un tono radicale nel primo Merleau-Ponty e un timbro (o una tonalità) fenomenologica in Nancy. Per farlo, mostreremo come l’ascolto riveli la soggettività come attività di “coesistenza” (e non di “coincidenza”), come “co-nascenza” (e non conoscenza), e come “traiettoria” (e non presenza statica). In altri termini, è attraverso l’ascolto che ritroviamo una teoria radicale della soggettività già presente in Fenomenologia della percezione, così come una tonalità fenomenologica in Nancy. (shrink)

Much controversy has surrounded the use of animals in research. Empirically, much of the research has focused on how ethical individuals believe animal research to be, but it has not systematically examined the specific beliefs or reasons why individuals do or do not believe animal research to be ethical. Study 1 investigated the thematic foundations for the decision that animal research is or is not ethical by examining the content of essays written by participants explaining why they do or do (...) not support the use of animals in research. Results indicated that individuals who believed animal research was ethical most often referenced beliefs that animal research furthered human well-being, provided mechanisms to cure disease, and was well-regulated. Individuals who believed animal research was not ethical most often referenced beliefs that animal research was inhumane, unnecessary, and nonconsensual. Study 2 used the themes to create a scale to assess animal research attitudes. (shrink)

The cultural logic contained within Emile Durkheim's work, specifically categories he puts forth in Suicide, creates the ground for Horrible Workers. This book is constructed to allow its readers to study the cases of Max Stirner, Arthur Rimbaud, Robert Johnson, and the Charles Manson Circle independently of one another or in a comparative fashion. Each case demonstrates in what ways particular social experiences lead to what have been perceived as unique forms of cultural expression.

H. Richard Uviller, Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in America, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, xvii + 318 pp.

Develops and defends a philosophical account of meaning, purpose, and value in human life and experience that is naturalistic without being reductionistic or scientistic.

Initial sketch of a concept of faith -- Facets of faith -- Faith and knowledge -- Faith and scientific knowledge -- Faith and morality -- Secular forms of faith -- Crises of faith -- My personal journey of faith.

I will discuss Fields Outline of a Theory of Truth. I will point out important properties of Kripkeleast fixed points constructions and theory. I do this not to demean Field’s superb work on truth but rather to suggest that there may be no really satisfactory conditional connective for languages containing their own truth predicates.